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RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
AARON J. BRODER*
WHAT IS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE?
M EDICAL MALPRACTICE is professional negligence. When a doctor
consents to treat a patient he obligates himself to use his best
judgment and to use reasonable care in the exercise of his skill
and the application of his learning. A doctor does not guarantee a good
result. If his patient sustains injury because of the physician's lack of
knowledge or skill, or because of his failure to exercise reasonable care,
or because of his failure to use his best judgment, he is liable to the
patient for his conduct. He is, however, not liable for a mere error of
judgment.'
Dean Prosser has written that the formula under which the theory
of malpractice is presented is that the physician must have exercised
that skill and have that knowledge which is commonly possessed by
members of the profession in good standing.2 Therefore, many malprac-
tice cases fail simply because the injured patient is unable to produce
evidence which demonstrates a departure from accepted standards of
the medical profession. Thus, mistaken diagnosis alone is not sufficient
to establish a case,3 nor is it sufficient to show the mere occurrence of
an undesirable result.4
It becomes at once obvious that the medical profession itself sets
* MR. BRODER is a partner in the firm of Moe Levine and Aaron J. Broder of New
York. He received his B.S. from City College of New York and his LL.B. from New
York University Law School. He is a member of the New York Bar. He is a Lecturer
at the Practicing Law Institute. MR. BRODER was past President of the New York State
Association of Trial Lawyers. He is a member of the American Trial Lawyers Association
and American Bar Association.
1 Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898) contains a complete statement
of the law with respect to the obligation of physicians to conform to community stan-
dards. See also 41 Am. JUR. Physicians and Surgeons § 90; 70 C.J.S. Physicians and
Surgeons § 41 (1951). These articles explain the requirement that physicians holding them-
selves out as specialists must conform to the standards of specialists in their community.
2 PROSSER, TORTS 165 (3rd. ed. 1964).
8 Meador v. Arnold, 264 Ky. 378, 94 S.W.2d 626 (1936).
4 Mogensen v. Hicks, 253 Iowa 139, 110 N.W.2d 563 (1961).
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the standards to which its members must adhere. It is a departure
from those standards that forms the basis of the lawsuit. 5
THE EFFECT OF THE CONCEPT OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE UPON
THE APPLICATION OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Historically, it has been the rule that res ipsa loquitur will be applied
in medical malpractice cases only where the negligence of the physician
may be inferred from facts which laymen can understand from their
common experience. This is to say that the errors complained of would
not occur if the physician had exercised care, and that these errors are
of such a nature as can be fully understood by laymen. As early as
1912 the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applied where a drainage
tube was left in a body after the wound had healed.' A decade later the
doctrine was applied in dealing with injury to a portion of the body
remote from the site of the operation.7 Another early application of
this doctrine is found in a case where a patient's jaw was fractured
during a tonsillectomy operation.8
However, in view of the law which postulates that medical malprac-
tice is to be found only where there is a departure from the standards
set by the medical profession itself, there must, perforce, be few situa-
tions indeed where lay people can be said to have the requisite knowl-
edge necessary to infer professional negligence. Since mere mistakes in
diagnosis or treatment or disastrous results without more do not con-
stitute prima facie evidence of malpractice, it becomes evident that
certain dramatic and tragic consequences which befall innocent vic-
tims of professional negligence must often go uncompensated in courts
of law. Prosser has summed up the situation as follows: "[Court]
decisions, together with the notorious unwillingness of members of the
medical profession to testify against one another, may impose an
insuperable handicap upon a plaintiff who cannot obtain the proof."'
5 As to the necessity of expert evidence to support an action for malpractice, see Annot.,
81 A.L.R.2d 597 (1962).
6 Evans v. Munro, 83 A. 82 (R.I. 1912).
7 Vergeldt v. Hartzel, 1 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1924).
8 Brown v. Shortlidge, 98 Cal. App. 352, 277 P. 134 (1929). See also Annot., 162 A.L.R.
1265 (1946); Annot., 152 A.L.R. 638 (1944) (which compiles malpractice cases in which
res ipsa loquitur has been applied); Lambert, Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applicable in Cases
of Injury by X-ray, 24 NACCA L.J. 31 (1959) (which collects these cases and explains
their significance) ; PROSSER, supra note 2, at 231-32.
9 Supra note 2, at 231.
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Therefore, in the vast majority of cases, it is necessary to procure
expert evidence to establish a departure from the standards set by the
medical community, since the average layman is hardly in the position
to infer such negligence without a demonstration of what the standard
is.
THE NECESSITY FOR EXPANDING THE CONCEPT OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
Both courts and astute commentators have taken note of the "con-
spiracy of silence" that prevails in the medical profession with regard
to the procurement of expert testimony to prove medical malpractice.Y
The reluctance of physicians to testify in medical malpractice cases
may be generally categorized into two specific areas: a reluctance of
physicians to testify in any kind of case, and a reluctance of physicians
to testify in medical malpractice cases. As to the first category, such
elements as loss of time and income, and unwillingness to take time
from patients who require care, the irritating and frustrating experi-
ence of cross-examination, and the unwanted burden of explaining
technical data in lay terms are some of the factors which have been
mentioned." The factors which militate to the reluctance of physicians
to testify in medical malpractice cases are: fear and self-interest,
reluctance to hurt fellow physicians, pressures from within the medical
profession and from insurance companies, and animosity toward law-
yers and patients who attack physicians' competency. 2
It becomes at once apparent that by reason of this understandable
reluctance to testify, rather than any conspiracy of silence, it is neces-
sary for the courts to assist the victim who presents himself to a physi-
cian with a comparatively limited disability and thereafter undergoes
medical care and treatment, with the end result of a permanent, crip-
pling disability. Recognizing that it is not always a simple matter to
procure a doctor to testify and condemn in open court the practice of
another, New York's high court, in McDermott v. Manhattan Eye,
Ear and Throat Hospital, has recently joined the courts of a growing
number of states which permit the plaintiff to examine the defendant's
10See Reynolds v. Struble, 128 Cal. App. 716, 18 P.2d 690 (1933); McDermott v.
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y. 2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469 (1964); LoUISEL.
& WILLIAMs, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 422-24 (1966).
11 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 10.
12 LOUISELL & WLLIAMs, supra note 10.
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doctor not only on "facts," but, in addition, on the defendant doctor's
concepts of accepted standards of medical practice in the community. 8
It is, therefore, now possible in many jurisdictions to conduct pretrial
depositions of the defendant doctor in order to ascertain the accepted
medical practice and deviation therefrom. Thereafter, upon the trial of
the action, it is likewise possible to cross-examine the defendant doctor
with respect to the standards of the profession. In summarizing the
status of the law in the various jurisdictions, the McDermott court
concluded:
While recognizing the right of a plaintiff in a malpractice action to call as a
witness the defendant doctor, the courts of several States have sought to limit
the type of questions which the plaintiff may put to him. Specifically, it has
been held that a defendant physician may be required to testify to "facts within
his knowledge"-that is, "what [he] actually saw and did"-but not as to whether
his actions deviated from the accepted standard of medical practice in the com-
munity, a matter deemed to call for "expert opinion." (Hull v. Plume, 131 N.J.L.
511, 516-517, 37 A.2d 53; see, also, Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 168, 132
P. 967; Hunder v. Rindlaub, 61 N.D. 389, 406-410, 237 N.W. 915; Forthofer v.
Arnold 60, Ohio App. 436, 441-442, 21 N.E.2d 869; cf. Ericksen v. Wilson, 266
Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687.) Other courts, however, permit the plaintiff to
examine his doctor-opponent as freely and fully as he could any other qualified
witness. (See Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 90-91, 147 P.2d 604; State for
Use of Miles v. Brainin, 224 Md. 156, 167 A.2d 117, 88 A.L.R.2d 1178; cf.
Snyder v. Pantaleo, 143 Conn. 290, 122 A.2d 21). 14
Under the more enlightened decisions it is possible to use standard
medical texts and treatises on a given subject to great advantage. By
use of such material the trial lawyer may test the defendant's knowl-
edge with regard to the standard procedures accepted and adopted in
the medical profession as indicated in the various texts on the subject.
While decisions such as McDermott tend to ameliorate the problem,
they do not cure it. As the court in McDermott stated, it would be the
height of optimism to expect that the plaintiff would gain very much
from calling and questioning the very doctor he is suing with respect
to medical standards. Perhaps that small group of attorneys who have
18 McDermott v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y. 2d 20, 203 N.E.2d 469
(1964).
14 Id. at 26-27, 203 N.E.2d at 473. It should be noted that before medical textbooks may
be used on cross examination, a foundation must be made to show that the witness recog-
nizes the authoritativeness of the texts. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 77 (1958); 7 Am. JR.
PROOF OF FACTS, Medical Books As Used in Cross Examination, Proof 1 (1960); RICH-
ARDSON, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 391(b) (9th ed. 1964); KRA ER, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE 50-53 (1965). See also St. Petersburg v. Ferguson, 193 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1967);
Superior Ice v. Belger, 337 S.W.2d 897 (Mo. 1966); Hastings v. Chrysler Corp., 273 App.
Div. 292, 77 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1948); Roveda v. Weiss, 11 App. Div. 2d 745, 204 N.Y.S.2d
699 (1960) ; Dinner v. Thorp, 54 Wash. 2d 90, 338 P.2d 137 (1959).
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themselves become proficient in medicine may achieve this desired re-
sult. However, the rationalizations and explanations of the defendant
doctor will normally overwhelm the plaintiff who is unable to procure
independent expert testimony.
It therefore becomes quite apparent that the courts must go much
further in assisting the victim of the "bad result." The layman, be he
attorney or client, is not the equal of the specialist whose treatment
and care resulted in crippling deformities. It is, therefore, more urgent
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be used in medical malpractice
cases than in almost any other kind of legal action. It should be re-
membered that this doctrine does not assure victory in every case for
the plaintiff. Rather, upon establishing certain of the requisites which
will be dealt with later, the plaintiff is merely afforded an opportunity
to have the case decided by a jury. To be sure, the defendant has every
right to come forward with his own evidence as well as that of his
colleagues in order to demonstrate that the treatment accorded the
plaintiff was in no way lacking and did, in fact, conform with the
standards which the medical profession has itself determined. By
operation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the burden of explana-
tion is thus shifted to the party best able to provide a full explanation
and to render a full accounting.
It is necessary, however, to expand the concept of res ipsa loquitur
in medical malpractice cases in order to afford an opportunity for the
community to determine whether or not the standards adopted by the
medical profession fulfill the obligations which the community places
upon it. Abortive legal actions and dismissals of cases which involve
serious crippling and impairment cannot be tolerated by the public
indefinitely. The legal community must grow with the needs of the
times and cannot remain passive in the face of the obvious injustice
which results not from a lack of merit, but from a lack of proof."5
THE ELEMENTS OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR ARE UNIQUELY APPLICABLE
TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
The phrase res ipsa loquitur is not a magic maxim. It is merely a
form of circumstantial evidence which depends upon the common un-
15 See PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 346 (1953), commented upon
in Lambert, Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury (Tort) Cases, 24 NACCA
L.J. 46, 76 (1959): "The courts are not reluctant to use res ipsa loquitur as a deliberate
instrument of policy to even the balance against the professional conspiracy of si-
lence. .. "
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derstandings of mankind for its application. It has been said that the
doctrine is properly applicable in those situations which "contain within
themselves a sufficient basis for an inference of negligence."' 6 Where
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury is in the exclu-
sive control of the defendant, and the occurrence is not one which
ordinarily occurs in the absence of negligence, then the conditions for
the application of the doctrine are fulfilled, provided that the damage
was not caused by any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the plaintiff.' 7
Perhaps the greatest impetus for the application of this doctrine to
medical malpractice is found in Ybarra v. Spangard,'8 the landmark
case in this field. In the course of an appendix operation, the plaintiff,
while unconscious, suffered paralysis of the right shoulder and neck.
He sued the surgeon, anesthetist, hospital, nurses and diagnostician.
Despite the absence of any proof with regard to the negligence of any
single defendant, the court nevertheless applied the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur against all of the defendants, stating: "[P]roof of the
receipt of a traumatic injury during the unconsciousness of anesthesia
was sufficient to make a prima facie case against all the defendants
under the rule of res ipsa loquitur."'
Ybarra recognized the need to apply the doctrine because of the
greater accessibility of the facts to the defendants as compared to the
plaintiff.20 Thus, the traditional elements of res ipsa loquitur are now
being considered against the background of the patient-physician rela-
tionship. This relationship is unique in that there are few other situa-
tions where human beings are more dependent on others, more at their
mercy and less likely to be sufficiently informed. 2' Translated into
16 Foltis v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 108, 38 N.E.2d 455 (1948).
17 See HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1081 (1956); RICHARDSON, supra note 14, at 67;
LOUSELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 425; Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 196
N.E. 36 (1935).
1825 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), appealed again, 93 Cal. App. 44, 208 P.2d
445 (1949).
19 Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal. App. 44, 45, 208 P.2d 445, 446 (1949). See Lambert,
Review of Leading Current Cases, 17 NACCA L.J. 255 (1956); Jennings, Tort Liability
of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 291 (1936); 24 So. Cal. L. Rev. 324
(1951); 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 756 (1951); 3 Wyo. L. REV. 230 (1949).
20 LouS sEL & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 427.
21 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 426. See also Seneries v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d
811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
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concrete terms, what have the courts been saying and doing with re-
spect to this doctrine in medical malpractice cases?
In Matlick v. Long Island Hospital, the New York Supreme Court
recently held that both a hospital and doctor could be found guilty of
malpractice upon the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
where the doctor and other employees of the hospital were present in
the operating room, and the patient, while under anesthesia, developed
a nervous condition specifically attributed to trauma by external force
to a part of the body unrelated to the area of injury.22 This case serves
to demonstrate the application of the traditional criteria to the specific
medical malpractice situation. There are, of course, modifications which
are required in order that the doctrine be applied. Thus, in Matlick,
the patient was not under any single individual's exclusive control.
The patient was under the control of various employees of the hospital
and a doctor who was not on the hospital staff. Nevertheless, the con-
cept of exclusive control is satisfied since it is shared by all of the
defendants. Noteworthy is the undeniable truth that these defendants
alone have within their power the ability to come forward and explain
what was done during the operation, how it was done, and in what
manner the injury to a remote portion of the body took place. Surely
a patient under anesthesia could only come to court with a big zero on
any of these matters. The next element is that the event would not
usually occur without negligence. The injury here was to a part of the
body remote from the operative site. It might well be argued that sur-
geons who operated in a bloody field and under extremely difficult
conditions might slip from time to time in accordance with the rules
of normal human frailty. Thus, certain hazards might inhere every
time a person is placed under anesthesia and subjected to the scalpel.
This is and should be beside the point. Let the doctors come forward
and establish these facts to the satisfaction of a jury, and let a jury
decide whether or not a given untoward result is a consequence of pro-
fessional negligence, or whether it is merely an incident of the risk
assumed by the procedures adopted by the medical profession. Courts
should cease their speculation as to whether or not an injury is remote,
or outside of the field of the operation, and such other considerations
as limit the application of this doctrine. One doctor might well say that
anything within a radius of "X" centimeters is in the operative field;
22 25 App. Div. 2d 538 (N.Y. 1966).
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another might say that a given surgical procedure exposes a greater or
lesser area to the possibilities of trauma, but the point is: Let them tell
it to the juryl As matters now stand, the law is entirely too restrictive
in this regard.
Finally, the Matlick case demonstrates the last criterion for the ap-
plication of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, to wit: that the plaintiff
shall not have contributed to the occurrence and shall not have par-
ticipated therein. Certainly, while under anesthesia, the participation
of the patient must of necessity be wholly lacking.
A common situation which also necessitates the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is one in which the doctor prescribes medi-
cation which is contraindicated by reason of the patient's history. Sup-
pose the evidence shows that the doctor never asked the patient certain
questions regarding the patient's prior physical condition. Thereafter
that patient develops certain side effects from the drug administered
by the doctor. In one case it was held that the common knowledge of
the jury combined with the information in the drug manufacturer's
brochure was sufficient to avoid dismissal. Under such circumstances,
the jury should be able to decide whether the doctor should have known
that the drug was contraindicated for this particular patient 3"
It should be noted that since the right to rely upon res ipsa loquitur
is lost only if the evidence fully explains the negligence, it is wise to
plead general negligence with reliance upon res ipsa loquitur as well as
specific negligence. 24
A review of factual situations where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
has been applied in medical malpractice cases amply demonstrates the
applicability of this doctrine to this area of law. Thus, where a patient
under sedation fell out of bed and suffered a fractured jaw, it was held
to be error to refuse to give a charge on res ipsa loquitur.23 The doc-
trine was also held applicable where a piece of gauze was left in a
wound resulting in an abscess, 26 and where a patient at a health resort
was injured when an examination table gave way.27 In another case it
23 Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961).
24 See Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961); Mitchell v. Robinson, 334
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
25 McDonald v. Foster Memorial Hosp., 170 Cal. App. 2d 85, 338 P.2d 607 (1959).
26 Young v. Fishback, 262 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1959). See also Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 200
(1957).
27 Davison v. Bernard McFadden Foundation, 4 App. Div. 2d 978, 167 N.Y.S.2d 784
(1957).
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was found that a prima facie case was established upon testimony that
a doctor administered a drug to a patient notwithstanding the patient's
warning that he was allergic to this drug.28
As to the present status of the law, it is worth repeating that res ipsa
loquitur is applicable to medical malpractice cases which involve for-
eign objects left in a person's body and in cases involving traumatic
injury during surgery to an area of the body remote from the operative
site, as where a portion of the body not intended to be removed is
negligently removed. 29 And, as to all these areas, it need no longer be
shown that the plaintiff was in the exclusive and individual control of
the defendant.
The doctrine of willful abandonment of a patient is a companion doc-
trine which may establish liability without the need for expert medical
evidence. Thus one court has stated:
At least, the jury might have found that the defendants had prematurely and
willfully discharged themselves from attention to the case while the patient was
desperately ill and before he was cured without giving information or advice as
to subsequent treatment or the desperate and dangerous condition and character
of the disease, all of which led to aggravation of his condition and illness.
Common sense and ordinary experience and knowledge, such as is possessed by
laymen, without the aid of medical expert evidence might properly have sug-
gested to the jury that the condition of the boy at the time that he was left
without hospitalization and abandoned by the defendants was not compatible with
skillful treatment.30
Another doctrine, informed consent, may also be utilized. Where a
physician fails to disclose possible dangers in the course of the therapy,
his failure to make a reasonable disclosure to his patient of these
known dangers may render him liable in malpractice. Thus, in one case
where a patient was being treated for arthritis by injection of gold, the
physician was held liable for having failed to disclose to his patient the
possibility of dermatitis which could result from these injections."
Throughout this line of cases, it is clear that the courts have been
struggling to find ways in which the common understandings of the
28 Stokes v. Dailey, 85 N.W.2d 745 (N.D. 1957). See also Res Ipsa Loquitur-Liability
Without Fault, 163 J. A.-_R. MED. Ass. 1055 (1957).
29 See Griffin v. Norman, 192 N.Y.S. 322 (App. Div. 1922).
3OMeiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 395-96, 34 N.E.2d 367, 370
(1941).
31 DiRosse v. Wein, 24 App. Div. 2d 510 (N.Y. 1965). Cf. Natanson v. Klein, 186
Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960) ; Mitchell v. Robinson, supra note 24.
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community might be utilized to determine whether the conduct of a
physician or hospital is reasonable under all of the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, there are already recognized categories
of malpractice cases wherein the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will be
applied. It can be assumed with some certainty that where the left
leg is removed instead of the right, where lysol is injected instead of
glucose, where an eye is enucleated during surgery on the left toe, the
doctrine will be applied. But, how does the law deal with a case where
a normal childbirth in a normal mother results in total paralysis of the
mother; where, after spinal anesthesia, the patient becomes palsied or
crippled; where an operative incision opens up after a patient leaves
her bed under orders of her physician? Such concepts as informed
consent and willful abandonment do not suffice to cover the vast cate-
gory of cases involving persons with comparatively minor conditions
who, during or after a prescribed course of treatment, become crippled
for life.
It is here advocated that the correct rule should be: Where the re-
sult of treatment is to render the patient substantially worse than be-
fore treatment was begun, the doctor should be compelled to come
forward and explain to the community the whys and wherefores of the
occurrence. It should be remembered that res ipsa loquitur is no pana-
cea for the plaintiffs. The defendant doctor or hospital has every op-
portunity to come forward with all the teaching of the medical profes-
sion: with professors and their citations of authority, with medical
treatises, with diplomates and specialists, colleagues and superiors.
If there is a normal incident and risk to the use of a given procedure,
then in the end, the community should decide whether or not the medi-
cal profession can justify this risk in terms of its incidence and se-
verity.
It is certainly possible that the rebutting evidence of the defendant
might be so conclusive and complete as to foreclose any possibility of
going to the jury, notwithstanding the fact that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur had been originally pleaded. Thus, for example, where
a clamp is found in the body of a person who has had prior surgery,
and it is conclusively demonstrated that the operation which was per-
formed by the defendant did not utilize clamps of this nature, there
[Vol. XVIII: 421
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might well be a conclusive rebuttal. One can, of course, envision
any number of situations where the doctrine might fail upon submis-
sion of proper rebuttal evidence.
Thus a more universal application of this doctrine would not be
"unfair" to the medical profession at all. A more widespread applica-
tion of the doctrine would perform the useful function of bringing the
community closer to the work of the medical profession by securing
for that community an opportunity to judge whether the standards
adopted by the medical profession are justifiable22
82 Some useful authorities in this field include: LOJISFLL & WILLIAMS, supra note 10,
at chs. 14 & 15; Pound and Lambert, Personal Injury (Tort) Law; Comment on Re-
cent Important Personal Injury (Tort) Cases, 16 NACCA L.J. 336 (1955) ; Recent Impor-
tant Tort Trends: Res Ipsa Locquitur Applicable to Hospital, 31 J. A.m. TRIAL LAW. 151
(1965) (reviewing fall-out-of-bed-cases); Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77
HARv. L. REv. 333 (1963); Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1962).
